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KRISTINE GRIGORIAN*
MGM v. Grokster. Adopting Patent Law's Active
Inducement Doctrine and Shifting the Focus to
Actions of Alleged Indirect Infringers
IN METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC. v. GROKSTER, LTD.,' the United States
Supreme Court considered whether distributors of a device capable of "both lawful
and unlawful use" are liable for the infringing acts of their technology users.2 The
Court adopted Patent Law's active inducement standard for secondary liability3 and
unanimously held that a distributor who actively encourages and promotes copy-
right infringement is liable for the infringing acts of third-party users of its prod-
uct.' By shifting the focus away from the technology and to the intent and conduct
of alleged infringers, Grokster provides copyright holders with sufficient protection
of their rights while avoiding undue interference with the innovation process. Un-
like the contributory infringement standard proposed in Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,' the newly adopted intent-based standard
provides copyright holders with clearer guidance for establishing a secondary liabil-
ity claim of infringement. The active inducement standard also protects innovation
by imposing a higher burden on copyright owners, requiring them to prove intent
to prevail on their infringement claims. Therefore, the Court's holding provides a
well-balanced approach that punishes those who actively encourage infringement
while, concurrently, safeguarding the rights of those who develop technologies for
substantially noninfringing uses.
I. THE CASE
Plaintiffs are motion picture studios, music publishers, and songwriters (collec-
tively "MGM") who own the copyrighted materials that were exchanged without
. B.A., Brigham Young University, M.A., Columbia University, J.D., University of Maryland School of
Law.
1. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. Id. at 2770.
3. Patent Law's active inducement standard, as codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), states that "[W]hoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch &
Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cit. 1990).
4. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
5. 464 U.S. 417 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
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authorization using defendants' software.6 Defendants, Grokster, Ltd. ("Grokster")
and StreamCast Networks, Inc. ("StreamCast"), distribute free software that enables
computer users to share electronic files, including digital music and motion pic-
tures through "peer-to-peer" ("P2P") networks! Grokster and StreamCast generate
their revenue from sale of advertising space on their respective networks Because
the cost of advertising is directly linked to the site traffic, Grokster's and Stream-
Cast's revenue increases as their user-base expands.9
In many respects, Grokster and StreamCast operate in a similar fashion to Nap-
ster.'5 As with Napster, the users of defendants' software can download the file-
sharing program from defendants' numerous servers." Unlike Napster, however,
defendants do not offer a centralized indexing system of available file names.' 2 In-
stead, each Grokster and StreamCast user maintains his or her own catalogue of
files and, upon request from another user, shares the requested content through the
P2P network. 3 Although defendants' software allows users to share any type of
digital file, for example, public domain and other authorized copyrighted works,
the majority of the files exchanged consist of unauthorized copyrighted works, in-
cluding those of the plaintiffs.'4 Defendants claim that while "potential noninfring-
ing uses of their software are infrequent in practice . . . they are significant in
6. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
7. Id. P2P networks do not employ central servers that hold all of the available files for the users to access.
Id. Instead, each computer user makes his or her files available to every other user in the P2? network. Id. As a
result of the decentralized nature of P2P networks a particular software program must provide a method of
indexing the available files to allow the users to access it. Id. Thus, "an index of files available for sharing is a
critical component of P2P file-sharing networks." Id.
8. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774.
9. Id.
10. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2003),
affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Similar to
Grokster and StreamCast, Napster provided on-line services and free software that enabled its users to (a) store
digital music files on their individual computers and make them available for copying by other Napster users;
(b) search for music files stored on other users' computers; and (c) exchange exact copies of the files with other
Napster users through the P2P network. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir.
2001), affd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). In contrast to Grokster and StreamCast, however, Napster main-
tained a centralized index of file names available for downloads on its own servers. Id. at 1012. Additionally,
Napster provided technical assistance to its users for the "indexing and searching of MP3 files." Id. at 1011.
11. Id.
12. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1159. Under StreamCast's "decentralized" index model, the software transmits a
search request to all network users, a search of individual index files is administered, and the results are routed
back to the requesting user. Id. Grokster, on the other hand, uses a "supernode" model where "a number of
select computers on the network are designated as indexing servers." Id. Under Grokster's system a user re-
questing a file connects to a "supernode" which in turn searches its index and delivers the results to the
requesting party. Id.
13. Id. at 1158.
14. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. Plaintiffs claim that "over 90% of the files exchanged [using defendants']
software ... involve[d] copyrighted material, 70% of which is owned by [plaintiff] Copyright Owners." Grok-
ster, 380 F.3d at 1158. While defendants contest the actual figure, they "concede the infringement in most
downloads." Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
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kind." It is undisputed that defendants failed to take any action to prevent further
infringement. 6 Likewise, defendants were not "mere passive recipients of informa-
tion about infringing use" as each company "took active steps to encourage
infringement."' 7
MGM filed suit against Grokster and StreamCast in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, alleging that defendants were liable for
vicarious and contributory copyright infringement because they "knowingly and
intentionally distributed . . . software [that would allow] users to reproduce and
distribute [unauthorized] copyrighted works in violation of the Copyright Act."' s
The district court, while acknowledging that the users of defendants' software in-
fringed on plaintiffs' copyrights, nevertheless granted partial summary judgment in
favor of Grokster and StreamCast, holding that the defendants were not secondarily
liable because they lacked "actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement."' 9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision holding that the defendants' activities did not constitute contributory or
vicarious copyright infringement.2"
In determining defendants' liability, the Ninth Circuit applied the two well-es-
tablished theories of secondary liability: contributory and vicarious copyright in-
fringement.2' The Ninth Circuit held that a product developer is liable under the
theory of contributory infringement if (1) it knows about direct infringement, and
(2) materially contributes to the infringing acts of its product users." On the ele-
ment of knowledge, the Ninth Circuit held that the level of knowledge required
depended on whether the product was "[clapable of substantial or commercially
significant noninfinging uses." 3 Relying on its interpretation of Sony,24 the Ninth
15. Id.
16. Id. Both defendants had notice of direct infringement from the users themselves. Users often contacted
Grokster and StreamCast with questions about playing copyrighted files they had downloaded using defend-
ants' software, and the defendants have responded with guidance and technical support. Id. Additionally, Plain-
tiffs notified defendants of "8 million copyrighted files that could be obtained using their software." Id. Yet
neither defendant made any effort to "filter copyrighted material from users' downloads" or to "block anyone
from continuing to use its software to share copyrighted files." Id. at 2774.
17. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772. The evidence demonstrated that defendants sought to capture the former
Napster audience and took active steps to promote infringement. First, defendants designed their software to
make it compatible with Napster's OpenNap program and to "leverage Napster's 50 million user base." Id. at
2773 (internal quotations omitted). Second, defendants promoted their products and services as Napster alter-
natives and substitutes. Id. Third, Grokster sent Napster users "newsletters promoting its ability to provide
particular, popular copyrighted materials." Id. Fourth, Grokster's name was a clear "derivative of Napster." Id.
Finally, defendants business models show that their software was designed with intent to facilitate downloads
of copyrighted works. Id. at 2774. As both companies derive their revenue from sales of advertising space, the
higher the volume of users, the greater the infringement, and the greater the revenue. Id.
18. Id. at 2771.
19. Id. at 2774.
20. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.
21. Id.
22. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775.
23. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161.
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Circuit reasoned that if the product at issue was capable of substantial noninfring-
ing uses, then the plaintiff would have to show the defendant's "[r]easonable
knowledge of specific infringing files."2 Conversely, if the defendants' software was
not capable of significant lawful uses, the plaintiff would then have to show that the
defendants had "constructive knowledge of infringing activities" of their software
users.
26
The Ninth Circuit found that based on the "declarations" of certain authors and
artists who either approved the distribution of their copyrighted works via the de-
fendants' software or used the software to distribute "public domain" works, defen-
dant's "software was [in fact] capable of substantial noninfringing uses." 27 Despite
plaintiffs' showing that only ten percent of the uses of defendants' software were
noninfringing, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the large number of total files ex-
changed meant that ten percent constituted a significant number of noninfringing
uses. 2' As the defendants' software was capable of substantial noninfringing uses,
the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs had to show that the defendants had actual
knowledge of specific infringement in order to prevail on their contributory in-
fringement claim. 9 The Ninth Circuit concluded that because of Grokster's and
StreamCast's "decentralized" indexing system, defendants lacked actual knowledge
of specific infringement."
On the issue of material contribution, the Ninth Circuit held that "defendants
[did not] materially contribute" to the infringing activities of their software users
because they did not provide "access ... to offending files or indexes ... rather it
was the users of the software who, by connecting to each other over the internet,
created the network and provided access."'" As for plaintiffs claim for vicarious
infringement, the Ninth Circuit did not find liability because Grokster and Stream-
Cast "did not monitor or control the use of the software, had no agreed-upon right
or ... ability to supervise its use, and had no independent duty to police infringe-
ment."32 Because of the circuit split over the standard of liability for aiding in copy-
right infringement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
Grokster and StreamCast, as "distributor [s] of a product capable of both lawful and
unlawful uses," were secondarily liable for the infringing acts of their users.33
24. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
25. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1161.
26. id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1162.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1163.
31. Id.
32. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775.
33. Id. at 2770.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although the Copyright Act34 does not explicitly recognize the possibility of secon-
dary liability, courts have relied on common law doctrines of contributory and
vicarious infringement to assess the liability of technology providers for infringing
uses of their technology. The first significant Supreme Court decision that ad-
dressed the theory of contributory copyright infringement was Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,3" where the Court declined to hold Sony
liable for contributory infringement for the distribution of its Betamax video re-
corders because it was "capable of substantial noninfringing uses."36 As technology
evolved and gave rise to new questions in copyright law, the lower courts began to
diverge on their interpretation of the Sony standard. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Nap-
ster, Inc.,37 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Sony standard to mean that the tech-
nology provider could be held liable for contributory infringement if he knew or
should have known about copyright infringement among its users.38 The Seventh
Circuit, in the Aimster Copyright Litigation,39 took a slightly different approach and
held that under the Sony standard Aimster's failure to show possible noninfringing
uses of its technology imputed knowledge on the defendant and served as evidence
of its liability.4" These conflicting interpretations among the circuits left the issue
ripe for the Supreme Court's review.
A. Application of Secondary Liability Theories in the Copyright Arena Before the
Advent of File-Sharing Technology
Since 1984, federal courts have applied the Sony standard to all copyright infringe-
ment cases involving the manufacturing and distribution of dual-use technologies,
and most recently to P2P file-sharing software.4' In Sony, motion picture studios
sued Sony for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement stemming from
Sony's development and distribution of the Betamax video tape recorders ("VTR"),
forerunner to VCRs.42 Relying on the "staple article ... of commerce" safe-harbor
34. The Copyright Act provides protection to "[oiriginal works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2002). The Act grants "exclusive rights" to copyright owners to use
and authorize the use of their work in five qualified ways, including "reproduction of the copyrighted work in
copies." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
35. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
36. Id. at 442.
37. 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
38. Id. at 1021-22.
39. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom., Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc., 540
U.S. 1107 (2004), reh'g denied, 543 U.S. 1180 (2005).
40. Id. at 653.
41. Christine Pope, Unfinished Business: Are Today's P2P Networks Liable for Copyright Infringement?, 2005
DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 22, *2-3 (2005).
42. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112
(1984).
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from patent law,43 the Court held that Sony's sale of Betamax recorders did not
constitute contributory copyright infringement because Betamax was a product
"capable of substantial noninfringing uses."44
Before applying its newly adopted standard to the facts in Sony, the Court recog-
nized that copyright law grants copyright holders the "'exclusive' rights to use and
to authorize the use of [their] works in five qualified ways, including reproduc[ing]
the copyrighted work[s] . ' The Court stated that under the Copyright Act, those
who violate copyright holders' exclusive rights would be deemed infringers. 6 The
Court also noted, however, that because copyright law repeatedly changes, courts
must find a balance between "a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effec-
tive-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly" and the pub-
lic's competing interest in the free flow of information. In adopting patent law's
contributory infringement theory of liability, which includes the staple-article of
commerce safe-harbor, the Court attempted to strike this important balance.
Although the Court recognized that consumers used Betamax recorders to create
libraries of copyrighted programs and to fast-forward through commercials while
watching an earlier taped program, both of which are infringing acts, the majority
of Betamax owners used the technology for so-called "time-shifting" purposes, that
is, recording a television program for viewing at a more convenient time. 8 When
used for the latter purpose, the Court found it noninfringing because it was sub-
stantially "private" and "noncommercial" in nature. 9 It reasoned that non-com-
mercial "time-shifting" of copyrighted programs does not violate copyright law
because: (1) many copyright owners, including producers of "sports, religious, and
educational" programs, allowed such "time-shifting" of their broadcasts;" and (2)
unauthorized time-shifting did not cause significant harm to the plaintiffs." The
Court concluded that because the quantity of authorized uses substantially out-
weighed unauthorized time-shifting, and because plaintiffs had suffered no actual
harm in terms of their copyrighted work's value, Sony could not be liable for con-
tributory infringement.12 Therefore, even though Sony's technology was occasion-
43. Id. at 440. The Patent Act states that the "sale of a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use" is not contributory infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2003).
44. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
45. Id. at 433 (quoting relevant parts of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002)).
46. Id. (referring to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2002)).
47. Id. at 442.
48. Id. at 423 (quotation in the original).
49. Id. at 449. The Court reasoned that if Betamax was used "to make copies for commercial or profit-
making purposes" such use would "presumably be unfair and in violation of the copyright law." Id.
50. Sony, 464 U.S. at 444-45 (quotation in the original).
51. Id. at 450.
52. Id. at 446-47. At least "7.3% of all Betamax usefs]" involved recording programs that had the express
authorization of the copyright holders. Id. at 424. Whereas plaintiffs owned only 10% or less of the market
share in television programming. Id. at 443.
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ally used for unlawful purposes, the fact that it was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses absolved Sony of liability.
Over the last twenty years, Sony guided courts in determining liability in indirect
copyright infringement cases. 3 The recent technological advances, however, includ-
ing the invention of MP3 players and P2P file-sharing networks, have transformed
the copyright landscape and have caused the courts to reinterpret and apply Sony to
particular violations in each case.54 Specifically, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits
have based liability on different interpretations of Sony in their respective evalua-
tions of indirect copyright infringement claims involving file-sharing technologies.
B. Applying Sony to P2P File-Sharing Software: Napster's and Ainster's
Divergence
In 1999, major record companies and music publishers sued Napster, an Internet
service that facilitated the transmission and exchange of copyrighted music files
through P2P networks, for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement."5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction
against Napster and held that under Sony, plaintiffs would likely prevail on their
contributory infringement claim because Napster had "actual knowledge [of] spe-
cific infringing" acts by its software users and failed to take any steps to prevent the
infringing activity. 6 The Ninth Circuit also found that Napster could be liable for
vicarious infringement because it failed to "police" its users' infringing activities
and "financially benefit[ed] from the continuing availability of infringing files on
its system.""
On the element of knowledge for the plaintiffs contributory infringement claim,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that based on an internal communication by one of
Napster's co-founders," and warnings from the recording association regarding
"12,000 infringing files" on Napster's network, Napster had direct notice of specific
infringing uses.59 As to material contribution, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Napster did in fact materially contribute to its users' infringing activities because it
"provid[ed] 'the site and facilities' for direct infringement. '"6
53. Pope, supra note 41, at *3.
54. Maria Termini, Time-Shifting in the Internet Age: Peer-to-Peer Sharing of the Television Content, 38
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 415, 425 (2005).
55. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
56. Id. at 1022.
57. Id. at 1024.
58. Id. at 1020. The record shows that in one of the internal communications, a Napster cofounder men-
tions the "need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses" because the users were exchanging
pirated materials. Id at 1020 n.5 (internal quotations omitted). The Ninth Circuit found that this statement,
along with other evidence pointing to defendants' knowledge of direct infringement was sufficient to impose
contributory liability. Id. at 1021.
59. Id. at 1020 n.5-1021.
60. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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Next, the Ninth Circuit analyzed plaintiffs vicarious infringement claim. As to
the first element, whether Napster received a direct financial benefit from its users'
infringing activities, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that even though Napster had not
yet received any revenue, its "future revenue directly depend[ed] on 'increases in its
user base"' and, thus, on the amount of infringing activity.6' Finally, in assessing
whether Napster had the right and the "ability to supervise its users' [infringing
activities]," the court held that Napster had both the ability to terminate its infring-
ing users' accounts, as well as block access to infringing content.62 It then concluded
that "[t] urning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit
gives rise to liability."63 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Sony to mean that
a defendant could be liable for contributory infringement if it "knew or had reason
to know" of infringing activities of its technology's users.'
In Aimster Copyright Litigation," owners of popular copyrighted music sued
John Deep and his corporation, alleging that Deep's "'Aimster' Internet service"
contributorily and vicariously infringed their copyrights.66 Like Napster, Aimster
facilitated the swapping of digitally encoded copyrighted music through its P2P
fie-sharing software.67 Aimster users relied on America Online's ("AOL") Instant
Messenger service ("AIM") to exchange music files.6" To connect to chat rooms that
enabled such fie-sharing, users first downloaded Aimster's software.69
The Seventh Circuit applied Sony and held that the recording industry would
likely prevail on its contributory infringement claims, and affirmed the preliminary
injunction against Aimster.7 ° The court rejected defendants' argument that it was
immune from liability under Sony because it lacked actual knowledge of direct
infringement, finding that "[w]illful blindness" constituted such knowledge in cop-
yright law.7 The court reasoned that Aimster not only had knowledge but also
assisted in infringement and financially benefited as a result.72
61. Id. at 1023 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002)).
62. Id.
63. Id (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261).
64. Id. at 1021-22.
65. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 645.
67. Id. Aimster provides its users with (a) free "proprietary software," which users can use to download
copyrighted files; (b) a "server [that] collects and organizes information obtained from the users but does not
make copies of swapped files;" and (c) "Club Aimster" that users can join to swap "top 40" songs. Id. at 646
(quotations in the original). Similar to Napster, Aimster provides a "Search For" feature that allows a particular
user to search through the files of other users on the network to locate the desired music and either download
it on to his or her computer or copy it onto a CD. Id.
68. Id. at 646.
69. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nor., Deep v.
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc., 540 U.S. 1107 (2004), reh'g denied, 543 U.S. 1180 (2005).
70. Id. at 651.
71. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
72. Id. at 652.
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After concluding that plaintiffs made a sufficient showing of infringing activity,
the court shifted the burden to Aimster to demonstrate that its service had "sub-
stantial noninfringing uses."" The court also "qualified just how likely a user [was]
to use Aimster service in [a] non-infringing manner," thereby adding "a new re-
quirement" that was absent from Sony. 4 Because Aimster failed to produce any
evidence of noninfringing use of its services, the court found it could not rely on
Sony's staple-article of commerce safe-harbor as a defense to contributory infringe-
ment. 5 The court discussed a number of potential noninfringing uses of Aimster
but dismissed them because Aimster failed to present evidence that anyone utilized
its software in those ways.76
Although the Seventh and Ninth Circuits ultimately reached the same result,
both holding technology providers liable for facilitating copyright infringement,
both courts are split over their interpretations of the standard of liability for aiding
copyright infringement. Specifically, the circuits diverged in their interpretations of
what constituted "substantial noninfringing use," as well as the evidentiary require-
ments the defendants would have to meet to gain protection as a staple-article of
commerce. The confusion among the circuits prompted the Supreme Court to re-
visit Sony's old standard and develop an alternative theory of secondary liability
that more effectively addresses these novel issues in copyright law.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster," the Supreme Court, in a unani-
mous decision delivered by Justice Souter, held that "one who distributes a device
with the object of promoting use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expres-
sion or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the result-
ing acts of infringement by third parties.""8 Before applying its newly adopted active
inducement standard to the facts of the instant case, the Court addressed the appli-
cability of the contributory and vicarious liability doctrines that guided the district
court and the Ninth Circuit decisions.79 The Court reaffirmed that although the
Copyright Act does not specifically provide for secondary liability, the common law
doctrines of contributory and vicarious infringement are well-settled in the law."0
The Court found that given the magnitude of infringing activity and the impracti-
73. Id.
74. Sally L. Parker, The Past, Present, and Future of Protecting One's Copyright in the Digital Age, 5 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 28, 42 (2005).
75. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
76. Id. at 652-53
77. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
78. Id. at 2780.
79. Id. at 2774-75.
80. Id. at 2776. "One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringe-
ment, and ... vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or
limit it." Id. (citations omitted).
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cability of enforcing copyright holders' rights against each individual direct in-
fringer, "[t]he argument for imposing indirect liability in this case" is particularly
compelling.8 '
The Court then turned to Sony, its most recent precedent on secondary liability
for copyright infringement. 82 It noted that there was no evidence in Sony that the
manufacturer had expressed an objective to facilitate copyright infringement
through use of its VTRs or took any affirmative steps to increase profits through
unlawful uses of its product. Therefore, the Court held that where a case, like
Grokster, presents evidence of intent or specific conduct "directed to promoting
infringement," nothing in Sony would preclude liability.84 Moreover, the Court rea-
soned that the Ninth Circuit erroneously expanded Sony by holding that distribu-
tors whose product was "capable of substantial lawful use," could "never be held
contributorily liable" for the infringing acts of their users.8" Likewise, the Court
found that the lower courts ignored all the evidence of the defendants' intent to
cause infringement. 6
After addressing the gaps in the Ninth Circuit's application of Sony, the Court
adopted Patent Law's active inducement theory of indirect infringement, codified
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and adopted in numerous cases, which states that "[e]vidence
of 'active steps ... taken to encourage direct infringement,' such as advertising an
infringing use . . . show an affirmative intent that the product be used to in-
fringe. 8s7 The Court noted that not all acts constitute evidence of intent to actively
induce infringement.8 8 As in Sony, the Court here reasoned that "mere knowledge"
of potential or actual infringement would not be enough to impose secondary lia-
bility, and neither would "ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as
offering customers technical support." 9
The Court concluded that liability for inducement would only arise when there
was evidence of "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct."9" Applying its
newly adopted inducement standard to the facts of the instant case, the Court high-
lighted several factors probative of defendants' intent to induce copyright infringe-
ment.9' First, it found that each defendant promoted itself as a Napster substitute
and made its software compatible with Napster's in order to capture Napster's mar-
ket share. 2 Second, the Court observed that neither defendant tried to devise "fil-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2776-77.
83. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777.
84. Id. at 2779.
85. Id. at 2778 (emphasis added).
86. id.
87. Id. at 2779 (internal citation omitted).
88. Id. at 2780.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2781.
92. Id.
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tering tools or other mechanisms" to reduce further infringement." Lastly, it noted
that both Grokster and StreamCast designed their business models in such a way
that their revenue from advertising sales was directly linked to the volume of in-
fringing uses.94 Based on these factors, the Court found that Grokster's and Stream-
Cast's "unlawful objective [was] unmistakable.""5 Therefore, the Court concluded
that defendants' unlawful intent coupled with their efforts to facilitate and en-
courage copyright infringement could render them indirectly liable for copyright
infringement.96 The Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded
the case for reconsideration of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment consider-
ing its newly adopted active inducement theory.97
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy, wrote a concurring
opinion and agreed with the Court's decision to vacate the Ninth Circuit's decision,
finding that it "misapplied" Sony.9" Justice Ginsburg, however, emphasized the need
for a stricter interpretation of Sony, which would require defendants to produce
concrete evidence of "substantial noninfringing uses" to escape liability under
Sony.99 In criticizing the lower courts' reliance on "anecdotal" and hearsay evidence
to support their conclusions, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the record failed to
support the defendants' proposition that their software had "substantial nonin-
fringing uses" and, thus, was immune from liability under Sony.' Instead, the re-
cord clearly demonstrated that Grokster's and StreamCast's software was used
overwhelmingly for infringing purposes.'
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor,' also concurred with
the Court's ruling that a distributor, whose technology is capable of both lawful
and unlawful uses, could be liable if it actively promoted infringement.' Addition-
93. id.
94. Id. at 2781-82.
95. Id. at 2782. In adopting a new standard, the Court did not overrule or modify the Sony decision.
Instead, the Court distinguished this case from Sony because the evidence in each case offered "a different basis
of liability." Id. at 2782. The Court reasoned that Sony was a case where there was no evidence of wrongful
intent or inducement, and therefore it did not provide a safe-harbor for defendants who had acted with an
improper purpose. Id. Justice Souter added that because of the substantial evidence in MGM's favor on "all
elements of inducement," summary judgment in favor of the defendants was inappropriate. Id.
96. Id. at 2781-82.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2783. (Ginsburg, J., joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 2786. Justice Ginsburg argued that there was a "genuine issue as to [a] material fact" not only
with respect to Grokster's and StreamCast's liability under the active inducement theory but also for contribu-
tory infringement, and therefore summary judgment in favor of the defendants was inappropriate. Id. at 2783
(quotation in the original).
100. Id. at 2785-86.
101. Id. at 2786. Justice Ginsburg concluded that "[ilf, on remand, the case is not resolved ... in favor of
MGM" on the premises of active inducement, then the District Court should revisit the record and "reconsider
... its interpretation of Sony[ I." Id. at 2787.
102. Id. (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
103. Id.
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ally, Justice Breyer supported the Court's decision not to "revisit" Sony." Justice
Breyer wrote separately, however, to emphasize his disagreement with the other
concurring Justices that the Ninth Circuit's decision to grant summary judgment in
favor of defendants on the basis of Sony lacked "adequate legal support."' ° The
Justice reasoned that "[w]hen measured against Sony's underlying evidence and
analysis," the record in this case clearly demonstrates that defendants' software
passed muster under Sony because it was "capable of substantial... noninfringing
uses.""° In rejecting Justice Ginsburg's proposition to modify the Sony standard,
Justice Breyer found it unnecessary to impose a heavier evidentiary burden on the
defendants.' 7 The Justice also reasoned that such an alteration would undercut the
protection Sony affords to inventors and entrepreneurs.'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Why Doesn't Sony Always Help? A Circuit Split Warrants the Supreme Court's
Clarification
Applying Sony to factually similar cases, the Ninth Circuit's Grokster and the
Seventh Circuit's Aimster decisions rendered divergent results. The Ninth Circuit in
Grokster held that P2P file-sharing software distributors, Grokster and StreamCast,
were not contributorily or vicariously liable for their users' acts of direct infringe-
ment because their products were capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 9 The
Ninth Circuit placed the burden of proving that Grokster and StreamCast had "rea-
sonable knowledge of specific infringement" on copyright holders, and concluded
that "constructive knowledge" could not be imputed to the software distributors. "°
The Seventh Circuit in Aimster, on the other hand, shifted the burden of showing
actual instances of noninfringing uses to the defendants."' Whereas the Seventh
Circuit focused on the probability of noninfringing uses," 2 the Ninth Circuit fo-
104. ld. (quotations in the original).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2788-89. Justice Breyer argued that as in Sony, the evidence in this case was mainly based on
generalized declarations of witnesses, which included statements of copyright owners who had authorized
distribution of their works using the defendants' software. Id. at 2789. Additionally, Justice Breyer reasoned
that there was "a significant future market for noninfringing uses of Grokster-type IP2P] software." Id. at 2789.
107. Id. at 2791.
108. Id. at 2792. Justice Breyer concluded that, in its present form, Sony properly balanced copyright hold-
ers' right for "effective ... protection of the[ir] statutory monopoly" and the interests of technology developers
and the society in free flow of information. Id. at 2791. Justice Breyer found that the standard in Sony was
"dear," "strongly technology protecting," "forward looking," and "mindful of the limitations" imposed on
judges in matters concerning technological development. Id. at 2791-92.
109. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1160.
110. Id. at 1162.
111. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651.
112. Pope, supra note 41, at 17.
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cused on the capability of substantial noninfringing uses."3 The disagreement
among the Circuits shows that Sony was either unclear, or outdated, or both."4
Although the newly adopted intent-based standard more keenly addresses the
current technological landscape and better fits the factual scenario of Grokster, the
Court should have nonetheless clarified Sony and resolved the circuit split. The
Grokster decision presented "unmistakable"" 5 evidence of the defendants' intent to
cause infringement. If a similar case arises in the future where copyright holders
could produce evidence of wrongful intent, it would make sense that plaintiffs
should be able to bypass traditional secondary liability standards (i.e., contributory
and vicarious infringement) and proceed directly under the active inducement the-
ory." 6 If, however, copyright holders are unable to make a clear showing of intent,
and decide to proceed under the theory of contributory infringement, courts will
likely apply the Sony standard. In doing so, courts will need to determine whether a
defendant's technology is a staple-article of commerce in order to gain the protec-
tion of Sony's safe-harbor. The Grokster decision, however, offers no guidance to
lower courts as to how the staple-article of commerce safe-harbor should be ap-
plied in the context of newly emerging technology. Courts will still continue to
grapple with "how much [actual or potential] use" is substantially noninfringing,
and whether to focus on the mere capability of noninfringing uses or the
probability of such uses."' Given the unresolved ambiguities still surrounding Sony,
courts are likely to steer away from applying Sony and, where possible, apply the
active inducement standard instead.
The Court, nevertheless, was correct not to apply Sony to the instant case and to
adopt a new liability standard, because both the underlying technology and the
product distributors' behavior in Grokster and Aimster markedly differed from that
in Sony. Moreover, the P2P networks are decentralized in nature, therefore, when
infringement occurs using this technology, copyright holders face the challenging
task of identifying the perpetrators and obtaining redress." 8
Although, under Sony's holding, copyright holders could initiate actions against
technology developers for indirect infringement, the developers could avoid liabil-
ity by showing that their technology is capable of "substantial noninfringing uses"
and that they lack knowledge of specific infringing conduct. Under the Court's
113. Parker, supra note 74, at 43.
114. See John Tehranian, The High Court in Cyberspace: MGM v. Grokster, Digital Copyright and Secondary
Infringement Theories, 47 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 22, 25 (2005) (proposing that the Supreme Court "clarify...
the level of noninfringing use [required] to shield companies from secondary copyright liability" under the
Sony standard).
115. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005).
116. William Sloan Coats et al., Pre- and Post-Grokster Copyright Infringement Liability for Secondary and
Trietary Parties, 842 PRACTICING L. INST. 221, 244 (2005).
117. Pope, supra note 41, at 25, 29.
118. Stephen W. Feingold et al., Secondary Liability After MGM v. Grokster, 13 METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS. 1, 12 (Sept. 2005).
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newly adopted active inducement theory, however, liability can still attach if tech-
nology developers take active steps to encourage infringement. Therefore, the
Court's new standard no longer allows alleged indirect infringers "to turn a blind
eye" to their technology's infringing uses." 9 Also, technology developers cannot
claim that they lacked the ability to control their network's content when such
"inability stem[med] [from their] willful desire to divest [themselves] of such con-
trol." '2 Although there is no guarantee that copyright holders will prevail, Grokster
provides all copyright holders additional means for seeking redress for violations of
their copyrights.
B. The New Standard Does Not Place an Undue Burden on Technological
Innovation
The fear raised by some that Grokster imposes an undue burden on technological
development, or discourages the dissemination of information, lacks merit. 2' In
reaching its decision, the Grokster Court remained "mindful of the need to keep
from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technolo-
gies with lawful and unlawful potential."' 2 The Court did not focus on the legality
of the P2P networks but rather on the intent and conduct of the defendants. 23
Finding the defendants' intent "unmistakable,"'' 24 the Court reasoned that such
wrongful intent combined with defendants' unlawful conduct could make defend-
ants liable. Thus, the Court appropriately placed the blame on the malicious con-
duct of technology developers rather than on the technology itself. Moreover, the
Grokster decision preserved Sony's safe-harbor applied to technologies with "sub-
stantial noninfringing uses. '" 25
Under Grokster, "businesses [can] continue to develop new technologies" pro-
vided they do not encourage their users to violate the copyright law. 126 Therefore, it
is reasonable to infer from Grokster that P2P file-sharing software and similar tech-
nologies remain perfectly legal. This is a legitimate finding because, as the Court
pointed out, file-sharing technologies can and have been used for legitimate, non-
infringing purposes. For example, universities, business, and government entities
use P2P file-sharing software for added efficiency and "a more stable platform on
which information can be shared [without being susceptible] to the types of attacks
that a centralized server faces.'
27
119. Pope, supra note 41, at 30.
120. Tehranian, supra note 114, at 26.
121. Parker, supra note 74, at 45 (suggesting that the Grokster decision unduly attacks technology creators
and "slows innovation" instead of solving piracy problems).
122. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005).
123. Feingold et al., supra note 118.
124. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782.
125. Feingold et al., supra note 118.
126. Id.
127. Parker, supra note 74, at 43.
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Additionally, P2P file-sharing software provides a "platform" for users to engage
in free speech and dissemination of ideas. 2 As in Sony, here the Court was unwill-
ing to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement at the expense of denying
noninfringing users the benefits of new technologies.129 By punishing "bad actors
like Grokster and StreamCast"'' 5 for their intentional wrongful conduct rather than
focusing on the legality of the technology, the Court provided requisite redress to
copyright holders while, concurrently, avoiding undue interference with vital tech-
nological development.
C. The Newly Adopted Active Inducement Standard Provides Clearer Guidance to
the Lower Courts
The active inducement standard provides clearer guidance to the lower courts than
Sony as the courts attempt to determine liability for indirect copyright infringe-
ment in the context of P2P file-sharing technologies. Unlike the vague Sony stan-
dard that created confusion among the courts, the Grokster holding requires
plaintiffs to prove two specific elements, (1) direct infringement, and (2) intent to
induce such infringement, in order to recover under the active inducement the-
ory.'3' Although the Court does not specifically define what constitutes bad intent,
it provides a factor-based approach that lower courts can use to determine bad
intent.' This approach is particularly effective as it allows courts to weigh factors
differently as the facts of each case change. Therefore, the Court's holding can be
applied to other cases involving inducement, and is not narrowly tailored to the
facts of this case.
D. Future Implications Post-Grokster
Since the Supreme Court's pronouncement of Grokster, many legal scholars are
eager to know the role the decision will play in future indirect copyright infringe-
ment cases, especially those involving file-sharing technology.'33 Given the ques-
tions that remain unresolved after the Grokster decision, like those regarding the
proper interpretation and application of Sony, future plaintiffs are likely to first
proceed under the active inducement theory and, alternatively, plead contributory
copyright infringement. To establish liability under the active inducement theory,
plaintiffs must prove that: (1) the defendant took "active steps" with intent to cause
infringement, and (2) the users of defendants' technology did in fact engage in
128. Id. at 44.
129. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
130. Coats et al., supra note 116, at 243.
131. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779-80.
132. Coats et al., supra note 116, at 243.
133. See Mark F. Schultz, Will BitTorrent Go the Way of Grokster?, 2 Sci. TECH. LAw. 4 (2006) (discussing
the implications of Grokster on the next-generation file sharing programs). See also Coats, supra note 115, at
242-46 (addressing the unresolved questions that remain after Grokster and Grokster's implication for contribu-
tory and vicarious infringement).
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infringing activity.'34 In cases involving P2P technology, as is typically the case,
proving intent will be the more difficult of the two elements. 3 However, since
intent can be established through circumstantial evidence, copyright holders with
legitimate infringement claims will most likely be able to meet this requirement by
showing that the conduct and activities of the alleged infringers in developing and
marketing their technology would rise to the level of active inducement. Courts will
then need to examine the alleged infringers' business models, marketing and pro-
motional strategy, willingness and capability of installing filtering and monitoring
mechanisms, and other affirmative conduct, in order to determine whether suffi-
cient evidence of wrongful intent exists. Although it is currently unclear as to how
many of these factors must be present for a court to find wrongful intent, one may
reasonably conclude that the more closely an alleged infringer's behavior resembles
that of Grokster and StreamCast, the more likely a court is to find liability under the
active inducement standard.
This is not to say, however, that Grokster favors copyright holders or offers them
an automatic victory. In fact, some might argue that Grokster makes it more oner-
ous for copyright holders to obtain redress because it requires them to conduct
more extensive discovery and incur greater legal expenses in order to successfully
prove intent.'36 While Grokster may appear unreasonably burdensome at first, it
actually benefits all parties involved. By setting the burden of proof higher and
requiring copyright holders to prove intent, Grokster will likely deter frivolous
claims that would unduly interfere with the innovation process. The newly adopted
standard also favors copyright holders because it offers clearer guidelines for those
with legitimate claims to seek a legal remedy when their rights are violated. There-
fore, in contrast to what some scholars may argue, Grokster successfully maintains a
delicate balance between innovation and copyright protection.
V. CONCLUSION
Grokster's message could not be any louder or clearer: innovators should continue
to develop new technologies but they must do so with a lawful intent. In devising a
new standard for liability, the Court in Grokster provided an alternative mechanism
under which copyright holders could seek redress against technology developers
and distributors that infringed on their intellectual property rights by proving un-
lawful intent. The new standard appropriately focuses on the infringers' conduct
and intent rather than the technology itself. Thus, the Court appropriately pre-
134. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781-82. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing the active inducement theory of liability as applied in patent law). See also Hewlett-
Packard, 909 F.2d at 1468.
135. Coats et al., supra note 116, at 243; Feingold, supra note 118.
136. Feingold et al., supra note 118 (suggesting that "Grokster actually raised the bar for secondary
liability.").
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serves the balance advanced in Sony, of ensuring protection for copyright holders
while avoiding unnecessary intrusion into technological innovation.
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